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Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing: A 
Comment on Ellen Goodman’s Stealth Marketing 
and Editorial Integrity 
Eric Goldman* 
Professor Ellen Goodman’s article, Stealth Marketing and Editorial 
Integrity, addresses the regulation of marketing that disguises itself as 
editorial content, which the article refers to as “stealth marketing.”  In an era 
of information overload and hypercommercialism, stealth marketing has 
become a common way for marketers to garner scarce consumer attention.  
With its growing ubiquity, stealth marketing has attracted considerable 
attention from academics, commentators, and consumers. 
Sponsorship disclosure laws—requiring marketers/publishers to 
disclose when content is marketing—can be used to regulate stealth 
marketing, and they are in fact used in broadcasting media.  Yet, despite their 
potentially important policy role, sponsorship disclosure laws get 
surprisingly little academic attention. 
Professor Goodman tackles this deficiency in the literature by 
considering how sponsorship disclosure can be a useful policy tool.  The 
article argues that the implicit deception in stealth marketing produces 
negative externalities by degrading consumer trust in all content they receive.  
The article then concludes that sponsorship disclosure laws can correct this 
negative externality and proposes that sponsorship disclosure laws (currently 
applicable only to a few media) be extended to more media. 
These conclusions are intuitively attractive.  It is human nature to want 
to know more rather than less, and in this situation it is very pragmatic to 
require publishers and marketers simply to tell us when they are engaged in 
marketing.  Even a libertarian might favor this regulation because it increases 
transparency that helps consumers make smarter marketplace decisions. 
Nevertheless, this Comment will explore some possible adverse 
consequences of sponsorship disclosure laws.  If Goodman’s article is 
premised on the need to correct negative externalities, these consequences 
also must be factored into the deliberations, which may suggest the need for 
further doctrinal and empirical research on the merits and disadvantages of 
sponsorship disclosure laws. 
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I. Why Do Consumers Care if Content is Marketing? 
Consumer attitudes toward marketing can be dichotomous and hard to 
reconcile.  Calfee & Ringold1 (in a study cited by Professor Goodman) 
highlighted this confusion in their review of many consumer surveys 
conducted between the 1920s and the 1980s.  Synthesizing the consistent 
findings of these surveys, Calfee & Ringold paradoxically concluded that 
70% of consumers think that marketing is often untruthful and seeks to 
persuade people to buy things they do not want,2 but 70% of consumers also 
think that marketing is useful for information.3 
Dichotomous findings like this raise some thorny issues for policy-
makers.  When can regulators rely on consumer opinions about marketing, 
and how should inconsistent opinions be accounted for? 
With this in mind, we should reconsider the universally recognized fact 
that consumers say that they want to know when content is marketing.  Given 
conflicting consumer attitudes toward marketing, it may not be prudent to 
base policy on this fact in isolation.  More importantly, this fact masks an 
underlying issue of significant import.  We know what consumers say they 
want, but we do not know why consumers want this—why do consumers care 
about distinguishing between marketing and editorial content, and how will 
consumers change their behavior in response to such disclosure?  Without 
understanding consumers’ motivations for wanting to know, or knowing 
what they will do with the disclosure, there is no way to tell if sponsorship 
disclosure laws actually achieve the desired outcome. 
Thus, the article attempts to address the manifestations of a problem 
(consumers want to know the status of content) without addressing the source 
of that problem (why they want to know).  Responding to manifestations of a 
problem, without correcting the root problem, may lead to unsatisfying 
results—and, as this Comment will explore, may create new and unexpected 
problems. 
II. Does Disclosure Help—or Hurt—Consumers? 
Clearly, consumers value marketing.  In fact, in some cases consumers 
value marketing content as much or more than editorial content.  For 
example, consumers regularly rate the utility of paid Internet search results 
(such as “sponsored links”) as equal to or better than unpaid search results 
generated by the search engine’s algorithms.4  In one survey, 75% of 
consumers felt this way.5 
 
1. John E. Calfee & Debra J. Ringold, The 70% Majority: Enduring Consumer Beliefs About 
Advertising, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 228 (1994). 
2. Id. at 236. 
3. Id. at 233. 
4. See, e.g., ICROSSING, HOW AMERICA SEARCHES 11 fig.17 (2005) (reporting that 49% either 
preferred sponsored search results or were indifferent between editorial search results and sponsored 
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Yet, consumer distrust toward marketing is so strong that consumers 
often disregard marketing without assessing its actual utility to them.  The 
“advertising” label is a powerful disclosure; it can single-handedly cause 
consumers to overlook content they would have otherwise found meritorious. 
A 2005 study by Jansen and Resnick6 illustrates this risk.  Consumers 
were shown multiple sets of Internet search results, some of which were 
labeled advertising.  Although the search results substantively were the same, 
consumers rated the unlabeled search results as more relevant than the 
labeled results.7  In other words, the advertising label single-handedly 
degraded the consumers’ relevancy assessment even though the search 
results had the same level of relevancy.8 
The risk of consumer overresponse to marketing labels poses an 
interesting policy conundrum.  Superficially, the populist approach would be 
to give consumers what they want (to know when content is marketing).  Yet, 
this approach has the risk of counterproductively and systematically 
increasing consumers’ erroneous content assessments, which in turn may 
hurt consumers’ ability to get content they would find useful.  At minimum, 
any cost–benefit analysis of sponsorship disclosure laws should account for 
the costs of these errors. 
III. Obscure Disclosures vs. Noisy Disclosures 
Assuming that mandatory sponsorship disclosures are cost–benefit 
justified, the article does not address how the disclosures should be presented 
to consumers.  Yet, the mechanical details are crucial to the efficacy of any 
proposed solution. 
If forced to make unwanted disclosures, publishers can do so half-
heartedly by burying sponsorship disclosure in such an obscure location that 
reasonable consumers probably will not see it.  This may very well describe 
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editorial search results) 
5. See Stefanie Olsen, Software Tool Smothers Sponsored Search, NEWS.COM, Nov. 14, 2003, 
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6. See Bernard J. Jansen & Marc Resnick, Examining Searcher Perceptions of and Interactions 
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academic/pubs/jansen_ecommerce_workshop.pdf. 
7. See Press Release, Penn State University, Consumers Suspicious of Sponsored Links (June 
10, 2005), http://live.psu.edu/story/12348 (“While study participants rated 52 percent of the organic 
results as ‘relevant,’ searchers described 42 percent of sponsored links as ‘relevant’ even though 
both sets of results were identical.”). 
8. Id. (stating that “[E]ven when the returned results are exactly the same, people still view 
what they thought of as the organic results as better [than the advertising results].” (quoting 
Professor Jim Jansen)). 
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the typical implementations by broadcasters today.  For example, television 
broadcasts often disclose sponsorships in the end-of-show credits that are 
effectively invisible to most consumers.  Consumers typically have little 
reason to read credits carefully, and even if they tried, it may be challenging 
to read the small type as it scrolls quickly and is obscured by the 
broadcaster’s allocation of screen space to other promotions.  If consumers 
do not notice obscure sponsorship disclosures, the disclosures cannot 
produce the positive benefits that the article seeks. 
Further, sponsorship disclosures may be made after the consumer has 
formed an opinion about the content (such as in end-of-show credits, after the 
consumer has watched the entire show).  I have not seen any empirical 
analysis of the consequences of after-the-fact sponsorship disclosures, but 
based on analogous psychological principles such as framing, ex post 
disclosures may not fully correct any misassessments of the content made by 
consumers. 
Thus, to achieve the sought-after policy benefits, sponsorship 
disclosures may need to be noticed by consumers and disclosed early in 
consumers’ content experience.  I call these “noisy disclosures.”  Noisy 
disclosures solve the obscurity problem but create at least two new ones. 
First, many consumers already suffer from information overload.  Yet, 
noisy disclosures consume more of their already-strapped attention.  Some 
consumers will feel that the disclosed information is valuable enough that 
they will not mind the “cost” of having their attention consumed, but others 
will resent the imposition.  For the latter consumers, the mandated disclosure 
becomes another form of spam (unwanted content). 
Ironically, mandated sponsorship disclosures could create a negative 
externality analogous to the one that the article attributes to stealth 
marketing.  The article argues that stealth marketing degrades consumer trust 
in otherwise-trustworthy content.  Similarly, to the extent that consumers do 
not find mandated sponsorship disclosures valuable to them, they will tune 
them out.  Further, if consumers routinely find mandated disclosures 
unhelpful, they may be inclined to adopt an across-the-board heuristic to tune 
out mandated disclosures, even if those disclosures are socially valuable.  
Thus, as disclosures generally become noisier, consumers may increasingly 
become disinterested in all of them—a different negative externality than the 
one identified by the article, but problematic nonetheless. 
Second, as discussed above, noisier disclosures should increase the 
number of consumers who see the disclosure and use it to make erroneous 
categorization judgments about the marketing.  Indeed, this effect may 
support a self-reinforcing feedback loop.  By mandating sponsorship 
disclosures, the government communicates to consumers that they should 
care about the distinctions between editorial and marketing content.  Thus, 
consumers may care about the editorial–marketing divide because the 
government has mandated disclosure, while the government may mandate 
disclosure because consumers say they care about the divide.  When the 
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government makes disclosures louder, it may simply be ratcheting up the 
communicative import of the message, heightening consumer sensitivity to 
the sponsorship disclosure and magnifying the risk of erroneous consumer 
reactions to the disclosure. 
IV. Conclusion 
As the Calfee & Ringold study indicates, most consumers view 
marketing suspiciously.  Among many possible reasons, consumers suspect 
that marketers are manipulating them to make unwanted choices for the 
marketer’s profits.  Stealth marketing represents the natural evolution of 
those fears about manipulation; the surreptitious nature of stealth marketing 
only heightens the perception that marketers are doing something improper.  
As Justice Brandeis has said, “Sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants,”9 so 
unmasking stealth marketing seems like an ideal way to curb such untoward 
behavior by marketers. 
But marketing’s bad reputation is partially undeserved.  Marketing can 
educate consumers, help them make better decisions, and improve 
marketplace competition in a way that benefits all consumers (even those not 
exposed to the marketing).  So the question remains: on balance, are we 
better off if marketing is transparent? 
Professor Goodman’s article posits an explanation why transparency is 
important.  But as this Comment has explored, transparency creates new 
additional costs that need to be considered.  The net effect of these 
theoretical considerations is indeterminate, making it hard to generate 
reliable policy recommendations. 
Despite this, the article makes one point that I wholeheartedly agree 
with.  Unless some empirical data indicate that consumers do, in fact, 
evaluate stealth marketing differently based on the medium used to deliver it, 
sponsorship disclosure rules should not differ by media.  However, this 
insight may support an across-the-board rollback of the rules rather than an 
expansion of them. 
 
9. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY – AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper & Row 1967) (1914). 
